Family
Planning and Islamic Jurisprudence
Azizah Y.
al-Hibri, J.D., Ph.D.
This is a
slightly edited version of a statement delivered at a panel on
Religious and Ethical Perspectives, convened by the NGO Steering
Committee, International Conference on Population and Development,
PREPCOM II, May, 1993, at the United Nations.
I am
very pleased to have the opportunity today to address you on
issues of family planning from an Islamic jurisprudential point of
view.
To understand this
point of view, we need to understand the basic framework for such
jurisprudence. First and foremost, the basic text providing
guidance on all Islamic matters is the Qur'an the revealed word of
God. No Muslim can adopt a point of view contrary to that of the
Qur'an.
But the Qur'an, which
provides a rich variety of specific rules and general principles,
does not explicitly address every possible situation that may face
a Muslim. For cases not explicitly addressed therein, Muslims look
to the example and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (his
"Sunnah") as a secondary source of guidance. Often,
that, too, leaves open some questions of interpretation or
application. In such cases, Muslims rely on ijtihad, which is the
ability to analyze a Qur'anic text or a problematic situation
within the relevant cultural and historical context and then
devise an appropriate interpretation or solution based on a
thorough understanding of Qur'anic principles and the Sunnah. This
approach results in a highly flexible jurisprudence and is rooted
in the Qur'anic verse which instructs Muslims who disagree on a
matter to seek its resolution by going back to the words of God
and his Prophet.<1>
The flexibility of
Islamic law is not accidental. It is an essential part of Qur'anic
philosophy, because Islam was revealed for all people and for all
times. Consequently, its jurisprudence must be capable of
responding to widely diverse needs and problems. Furthermore,
Islam was revealed gradually. This fact (as well as certain verses
in the Qur'an) illustrates the divine recognition of the human
difficulty in adjusting to sudden change.<2> Hence, flexibility
and evolution are inherent characteristics of the religion. It
must be noted, however, that this flexibility has its limitations.
It does not extend to the most fundamental tenets of Islam, such
as the belief in the unity of God.
Among the
fundamental principles of ijtihad are the following:
1. Laws
change with changes in time and place;
2. Choosing the lesser of two harms; and
3. Preserving public interest.<3>
In
discussing issues of family planning, it is important to keep all
of these principles and the basic legal framework in mind.
For example, when a
Muslim scholar reaches a conclusion about contraception or
abortion, it is important for that scholar and the Muslim
community he addresses to evaluate such conclusion in light of
their public interest. If the existence or well-being of the
community is being threatened for some reason, then the scholar
and each member of the community must consider that fact, which is
subsumed under Principle (3) above, in reaching their own final
conclusions. This is one reason why laws change with the change of
time and place.
Family Planning in the Islamic Tradition
Like the other two Abrahamic religions, Islam values the family
and encourages procreation. Some Muslims have concluded from these
facts that Islam does not permit family planning. Two pieces of
evidence are often cited in support of this conclusion. First,
that the Qur'an prohibited Muslims from killing their children for
fear of want.<4> Second, that the Prophet exhorted
Muslims to multiply.<5> But this argument does not do
justice to the complexity of the Islamic position and the totality
of its teachings. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain the
established fact that the Prophet knew that some of his
companions, including his cousin Ali, practiced al-'azl (coitus
interruptus) and yet he did not prohibit the practice.<6>
To understand the
fullness of the Islamic position on family planning, we need to
look more carefully at the total picture. Its departure point, of
course, is to encourage the life principle. This position is
emphasized in the Qur'anic prohibition of infanticide, a
wide-spread pre-Islamic practice involving born children and
motivated mostly by economic and gender considerations. It is also
exemplified by the Prophet's exhortation to multiply.
But such a basic
position does not necessitate the conclusion that contraception,
or even abortion, is prohibited. Indeed, historically, the
majority view among Muslims scholars on contraception has been
that it is permissible with the wife's consent, though perhaps
disliked in certain cases. The wife's consent is required because
Islam recognizes the wife's right to sexual enjoyment and
procreation.
A leading proponent
of this view is al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who based his
conclusions on the well-established principle that what is not
prohibited by Quranic text or an authenticated Hadith (words of
the Prophet), or by analogical reasoning with respect to either or
both, is permissible.<7> As to contraception, he
notes, there are no such prohibitions. In fact, the opposite is
true. His analogical logic is startling in its simplicity. In one
part of his argument, he notes that, despite the prophetic
exhortation to multiply, it is nevertheless permissible for a
Muslim to remain single. The effect of remaining single on
multiplying, he reasoned, is no different than the effect of
practicing al-'azl. Since the one is permitted, it follows that
the other, without more, is also permitted.<8>
Al-Ghazali
argues further that although contraception is permissible, it is
makruh (disliked or disfavored) if practiced to avoid, for
example, female offspring. One major justification for this
conclusion is that preference for male offspring is frowned upon
in the Qur'an.<9> Al-Ghazali, however, views
contraception as permissible for other reasons such as protecting
a woman from the dangers of childbirth, avoiding poverty, and even
preserving a woman's beauty.<10>
In the case of
family planning through contraception, the wish to avoid poverty
does not infringe on the right to life of a born human being. To
the contrary, it goal is to preserve a dignified quality of life
for those already born. On the other hand, using contraception to
avoid having more females reflects a world view and a value system
antithetical to that of the Qur'an. It was thus makruh and
discouraged by scholars like al-Ghazali.<11>
Other jurists
agreed with al-Ghazali's basic position on contraception
but disagreed on what constitutes makruh behavior. Such
disagreement may very well have been founded on their disparate
historical and cultural experiences. In other words, these are the
kind of differences anticipated and tolerated by the first
principle, and perhaps the other principles of ijtihad listed
above.
Contraception
Semen in Islam has no special value. Alone, it is not life and
whether it ever develops into life is a matter of divine
omnipotence. The Prophet himself said "not of all the semen a
child is formed..."<12> He also told his
companions that if God wanted to create a human life, God would do
so anyway, whether they practiced al-'azl or not.<13> A
delicate analogy used by al-Ghazali further illustrates the same
point. Al-Ghazali likens intercourse to a contract because it
consists of an offer and an acceptance. Thus, so long as the offer
has not been accepted, it may be withdrawn.<14>
Ibn
Hazm, who lived in Islamic Spain (d.
1063), represents a minority view on contraception. He adopts an
extremely restrictive position arguing that it is a form of hidden
infanticide and is thus prohibited by the Qur'an. His argument is
based on a report by Judama, a woman who reportedly heard the
Prophet refer to al-'azl as hidden infanticide.<15> Al-Ghazali
and many others treat the same report differently. Focusing on the
fact that a fetus does not become a living being until it reaches
a certain stage of development, al-Ghazali concludes that the
reported saying indicates karahiyah (disfavor) and not
prohibition. In doing so, he relied in part on companion Ali's
rejection of the description of al-'azl as "minor
infanticide."<16>
Among the five
major traditional Islamic schools of thought, the majority of Hanafis,
Malikis, Ja'faris (Imamis) and Hanbalis permitted the
practice of al-'azl, subject to the wife's consent.<17>
In fact, some Ja'fari and Maliki scholars gave the
wife the right to monetary compensation from her husband if he
were to engage in al-'azl without her permission.<18>
But, Ja'faris permitted al-'azl without the wife's consent
for each particular occurrence, if she had given a general consent
at the outset.<19> Some Hanafis and Hanbalis,
however, differed with the majority view of their respective
schools as to the need for the wife's consent.<20> Shafi'is
permitted al-'azl even without such consent, because in their
view, the wife is entitled to intercourse but not ejaculation.<21>
Recently, some
Muslim scholars have returned to Ibn Hazm's minority view.
Part of the reason may be rooted in their concern for the Muslim
Ummah (community) whom they feel has become the intended target of
population control propaganda by the West. In such a case,
however, the proper analysis is not to go back to the
controversial arguments of Ibn Hazm. Rather, Muslim
scholars should make their position clear to other Muslims by
appealing to legitimate jurisprudential principles, such as that
of public interest. This approach would allow them to reach their
desired conclusion, while at the same time utilizing full
disclosure with other Muslims. It would also preserve the
integrity of scholarly religious analysis, relate to the community
on a mature and principled basis, and raise the community's
consciousness while leaving room for dissenting personal decisions
by the average Muslim.
Abortion
Another major form of population control is abortion. The majority
of Muslim scholars permit abortion, although they differ on the
stage of fetal development beyond which it becomes prohibited.<22>
To understand the differences in their positions, we have to first
study what the Qur'an says about this matter.
There are two
Qur'anic passages that address this issue. Both of them describe
stages of fetal development.<23> These can be
summarized as follows: the semen (nutfah) develops in the womb,
together with the ovum, into a clinging clot ('alaqah), then a
chewed lump (mudghah) complete in itself yet incomplete, then
another act of creation takes place (khalqan akhar). At this last
stage, ensoulment occurs.
Scholars agree that
abortion at or after the ensoulment stage is prohibited, except to
protect the mother's life.<24> They disagree,
however, on when this stage is reached and whether abortion at an
even earlier stage is permitted. One group permits abortion up to
120 days.<25> Another prohibits it as early as 80 or
even 40 days after conception.<26> In either case,
many hold the view that abortion does not abruptly become
prohibited at a certain stage (whether that stage is reached at
ensoulment or earlier). Rather, abortion becomes increasingly
makruh as the fetus develops, until it becomes finally prohibited.<27>
On the other
hand, a minority of scholars hold a very strict view which
prohibits abortion the minute the semen attaches to the uterus.
They argue that the attached semen is already on its way to being
ensouled.<28> These scholars also view abortions
performed at later stages of pregnancy as yet more serious than
those performed at the earlier stages. This position was adopted
recently by some Muslim jurists, who relied on scientific evidence
in reaching their conclusion. While saluting the various efforts
of earlier Muslim jurists on the subject, they concluded
"from a review of contemporary medical and scientific
advances. . . that an embryo is a living organism from the moment
of conception."<29>
Among the major
traditional schools of thought, the majority of Hanafis and
Shafi’is permit abortion before the 120 days period.<30>
Among the minority of Shafi’is who oppose this view is al-Ghazali
who describes abortion as a jinayah (crime).<31>
Hanbalis permit abortion before 40 days (by taking medicine) while
Ja'faris and Malikis prohibit it at any time.<32> Of
course, all these views permit abortion for exigencies such as
saving the mother's life even after the ensoulment stage.<33>
It is
worth noting that for centuries Muslim societies made room for
these widely differing schools of thought, allowing them to thrive
in their midst, side by side. The schools were generally regarded
as examples of good and honest ijtihad. How a particular Muslim
came out on any one of these issues was viewed as a matter of
personal conscience. One conclusion that can be drawn, however,
from the various ijtihads is that family planning through
contraception is less controversial and hence preferable to family
planning through abortion.
If a woman is
nevertheless faced with an abortion decision, and if after
deliberation she truly finds the reasoning of a permissive group
(like the majority Hanafi view) convincing, then she should not be
discouraged by the prior discussion on disagreements, and should
feel free to take advantage of the license under her preferred
view. This advice is based on the Prophet's position of
encouraging ijtihad and on the Islamic scholarly tradition of
regarding differences among mujtahids (those who engage in
ijtihad) as an expression of the mercy of God upon Muslims.<34>
Final Considerations
This is a very short overview of Islamic jurisprudence on this
topic. The majority view is that a Muslim family is permitted to
engage in family planning. The actual answer, however, to today's
question of whether Muslim families ought to be encouraged by
their institutions to engage in family planning is somewhat more
complicated. The special features of this historical epoch and its
technetronic societies must be analyzed carefully so that Muslim
scholars and leaders do not lend support to policies which, in the
final analysis, turn out to be contrary to the Islamic spirit or
to public interest. For example, while Islam permits a family to
plan its growth rationally in order to avoid poverty, this
permission should not be distorted so as to discourage or deny
poorer people or less technologically developed countries their
right to propagation. Indeed, the Qur'an tells us that God takes
care of all creatures.<35>
Endnotes
* In this
article, the author provided a brief overview of Islamic
jurisprudence on the subject matter but did not recommend any
particular position with respect to the debate on family planning.
The author, however, wishes to emphasize to the reader the
importance of correctly analyzing arguments and factors involved
in the particular situation under consideration, in light of all
relevant communal as well as individual factors. The author also
wishes to emphasize the importance of formulating such analysis
free from all forms of compulsion and coercion, whether conscious
or subconscious, individual or organized, including that of
targeted advertising campaigns. For, in the final analysis, each
Muslim is personally responsible towards God for her own choices.
* I would
like to thank Drs. Fathi Osman, Hassan Hathout and Maher Hathout,
members of The Islamic Center of Southern California Center, for
their valuable comments on the original text of this article. This
text has been revised in response to their comments. However, the
author is solely responsible for the views expressed herein.
* Since this
article was first given as a speech at a United Nations forum, and
attended by an international audience, I made a special effort to
reference my footnotes to reliable English- language works
whenever possible. These works provide references for those
interested in further research in original Arabic-language
sources. The author’s English-language articles, some of which
are referred to here, also provide references to original Arabic
sources.
Courtesy: Muslim Women
Lawyers for Human Rights
www.karamah.org

References
1.
Qur'an 4:59. This and other Qur'anic cites in this paper refer first to the
appropriate surah (Chapter), and then to the relevant ayah (verse). The author
recommends the translation by A.Yusuf Ali (Amana Corp., Brentwood, Maryland,
1983), although she does not abide by it here and prefers to use her own.
2.
For more on this and other concepts discussed in this introduction, see Islamic
Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, by the author, published in 24
The Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1 at 3-10 (1992).
3.
Ibid., at 8-10. See also Subhi Mahmassani, Falsafat al-Tashri' fi al-Islam
200-207, 480 (Dar al-'Ilm li al-Malayin, Beirut, 1961).
4.
Qur'an 17:31, 6:151.
5.
2 Abu Daud Sulayman ibn al-Ash'ath al-Sijistani al-Azdi, Sunan Abi Daud 220
(reprint, Dar 'Ihya' al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah, Beirut, 1980). See also, Abdel
Rahim Omran, Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam 100-101(Routledge, London,
1992). Omran's book is an excellent work in terms of scholarship and knowledge
of the tradition. The various hadiths contained in it have been authenticated by
a committee of scholars at al-Azhar.
6.
2 Abu Hamid M. al-Ghazali, 'Ihya' Ulum al-Din 54 (reprint, Mustafa al-Babi
al-Halabi wa awladuh, Cairo 1939), with an authentication in the margin of the
sayings of the Prophet by Hafiz al-Islam al-Iraqi; Omran, supra note 5, at
118-19.
7.
The Qur'an refers to this principle in several contexts. See, e.g., Qur'an
6:119, 5:90, 66:1, and 3:50. For al-Ghazali's argument, see al-Ghazali, supra
note 6, at 53. See discussion by Subhi Mahmassani of this point in Muqaddimah fi
' Ihya' Ulum al-Shari'ah 20-21(Dar al-'Ilm li al- Malayin, Beirut, 1962). See
also B. F. Mussallam, Sex and Society in Islam 17 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1983). This is another excellent book, in the English language, on
this topic. Another short discussion of this important principle appears in
Omran, supra note 5, at 75-76.
8.
Al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 53. But al-Ghazali adds here that contraception is
not like abortion which he views as a jinayah (crime) even at the earliest
stages of pregnancy. Mussallam, supra note 7, at 17.
9.
Qur'an 16:58.
10.
Al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 53.
11.
Ibid.
12.
4 Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Qushayri, Sahih Muslim 159 (Muhammad Ali Sabih wa
Awladuh, Egypt, 1963?). See also, Omran, supra note 5, at 120.
13.
Muslim, supra note 12, at 158. See also, Omran, supra note 5, at 122.
14.
Al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 53; Mussallam, supra note 7, at 18.
15.
11 Abu Muhammad ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla 291-92 (reprint, Maktabat al-Jumhuriyah al-
Arabiyah, Cairo, 1970); Omran, supra note 5, at 136; also mentioned in
al-Ghazali, supra note 6 at 54, who calls her "Juthama." Omran
contests the accuracy of the name used by al- Ghazali and others. See Omran,
supra note 5, at 130. For more on Ibn Hazm's views, see also al-Muhalla, vs. 10
and 12. In the latter volume, Ibn Hazm discusses appropriate awards for torts
resulting in miscarriage at various stages of pregnancy. The discussion gives a
clearer picture of Ibn Hazm's views.
16.
Al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 54; Omran, supra note 5, at 133.
17.
7 Wahbah al-Zuhaili, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Addillatuh 331-332 (Dar al-Fikr,
Damascus, 1984). See also 5 Abd al-Halim Abu Shuqqah, Tahrir al-Mar'ah fi 'Asr
al- Risalah 196-97 (Dar al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1990), and Omran's discussion of these
various positions, Omran, supra note 5, at 152-167. Also, it is important to
note that the Shi'i schools of ijtihad are many, and their ijtihad tradition is
very rich and varied. We treat here only, and in a very general manner, the
Imami Ja'fari tradition.
18.
Omran, supra note 5, at 155, 165; Mussallam, supra note 7, at 32.
19.
Omran, supra note 5, at 153-54, 162-63; Mussallam, supra note 7, at 31-32.
20.
Omran, supra note 5, at 159; Mussallam, supra note 7, at 31-32.
21.
Omran, supra note 5, at 159; Mussallam, supra note 7, at 31.
22.
For a quick outline of the various points of view on this matter, see Omran,
supra note 5, at 190-193. See also Muhammad al-Bar, Mushkilat al-Ijhadh 5-4
(Al-Dar al-Saudiyah li al- Nashr wa al-Tawzi', Jeddah, 1985).
23.
Qur'an 22:5 and 23:12-14.
24.
Omran, supra note 5, at 191.
25.
Madkur, Muhammad Salam, Al-Janin wa al-Ahkam al-Muta'alliqah bihi fi al-fiqh
al-Islami 301-302 (Dar al-Nahdhah al-Arabiyah, Cairo, 1969) (describing the
Hanafi view which permits abortion at that stage even without the husband's
permission; also noting that many Hanafis regard abortion during that early
period as makruh, if without good reason). Omran, supra note 5, at 191; al-Bar,
supra note 22, at 42.
26.
Omran, supra note 5, at 190-192. Drs. Fathi Osman, Hassan Hathout and Maher
Hathout hold the view that differences as to the number of days before which
abortion is permissible was a function of the state of knowledge at the time the
specific ijtihad took place. Dr. Osman also adds that it was a function of the
dominant culture. Dr. Hassan Hathout views the controversy as based on
differences in determining the stage at which fetal life begins. He argues that
such determination should not be confused with the determination of when
ensoulment takes place, i.e. when the ruh (soul) enters the body. For evidence,
he cites the Qur'anic verse 7:85, which states that only God knows about the
ruh. He argues that ensoulment takes place in a living being and that it is
impermissible to perform abortion on a living being even before ensoulment. For
more on this point of view, see endnote 29 and related text.
27.
See, e.g., al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 53. While he views abortion as
prohibited from the moment of conception, he nevertheless argues that abortion
at a later stage is an even greater jinayah.
28.
Madkur, supra note 25, at 302 (describing the Maliki view). See also, Omran,
supra note 5, at 190-193; al-Bar, supra note 22, at 40-41.
29.
Abd El-Rahman al-Awadhi, ed., Human Reproduction in Islam: The Full Minutes of
the Seminar on Human Reproduction in Islam 276, held in Kuwait on May 24, 1983,
Ahmad al-Gindi, trans. (Kuwait, 1989). The point of view of jurists meeting in
Kuwait is both interesting and worthy of further discussion. For one, it may
have unnecessarily technologized the issue of abortion and reduced it to a
medical determination about the beginning of life. For another, it may not have
sufficiently taken into account the controversies that exist even today, in
medical as well as non-medical circles, on the question of when life begins.
(For a preliminary discussion of the role of medicine in Islamic jurisprudence,
see Madkur, pp. 89-103.) I would like to address the issue in greater detail in
the future. Finally, it is also worth noting that this modern view coincides in
its conclusion (though not reasoning) with the view of al-Ghazali. (See endnotes
8 and 27.)
30.
Madkur, supra note 25, at 87, 301-305 (noting that some Shafi’is disagreed on
what constitutes a good reason for abortion prior to 120 days). Omran, supra
note 5, at 190-193.
31.
Al-Ghazali, supra note 6, at 53.
32.
Madkur, supra note 25, at 304-305 (noting that Hanbalis did not treat this
subject in great detail; also, noting that another Shi'i group, the Zaydi's,
have no problem with abortion up to the stage of mudghah, the last stage before
which the fetus is ensouled). See also, Omran, supra note 5, at 191; al-Bar,
supra note 22, at 40. See also, 19 Muhammad al-'Amili, Wasa'il al- Shi'ah 15
(reprint, Beirut, n.d.). Note that the Hanbali scholar, Ibn Rajab, shares
al-Ghazali's view. Al-Bar, supra note 22, at 40.
33.
Omran, supra note 5, at 191; al-Bar, supra note 22, at 44.
34.
For a discussion of this point, see the author’s "Islamic
Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy," pp. 5-7. See also
Mahmassani, Muqaddimah fi 'Ihya' 'Ulum al Shari' ah, supra note 7, esp. at
13-31.
35. Qur'an
11:6.
|